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The Middle East

by

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



THE MIDDLE EAST IN NEW PERSPECTIVE

*Address before Dayton World Affairs
Council, Dayton, Ohio, April 9, 1954*

FACING REALITIES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE

*Address before American Council for Judaism,
Philadelphia, Pa., May 1, 1954*

Reprinted from the *Department of State Bulletins*
of April 26 and May 10, 1954

The Middle East in New Perspective

by Henry A. Byroade

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To me the Middle East is one of the most fascinating parts of the world, and I am convinced all Americans would find it so. It has been my good fortune to visit each of its states at least twice, and at each stop one wishes he could stay long enough to find out more—about not only the present-day political and economic problems but the culture and traditions, the hopes and aspirations of the people themselves.

The area for which I am responsible abounds in superlative contrasts. It flaunts diversity of costumes unrivaled anywhere else in the world from the Evzones of Greece, the veiled Tuaregs of North Africa, the jaunty agal and kaffiyeh of the desert Arab, and the multicolored jackets of the Kurd to the Dinka, the Nuwwar and the Shilluk of the Sudan who wears nothing at all. The world's richest men and the world's poorest have lived side by side in this area for ages. The piercing minaret of the mosque, the church belfry, the dome of the synagogue attest to the evolution of the world's loftiest religious faiths. And where the peasant still plants his seed with the simplest of wooden tools, airplanes spread insecticides to halt the march of the devouring locust. Nowhere else in our universe do such extremes stand in intimate juxtaposition.

One's study of history—or one's visit to the area—need not be exhaustive or lengthy for the conclusion that these people, beset as they are by present day embroilments or economic poverty, have had a rich life—rich in the things one may say make life worthwhile.

In fact the strength of our Western civilization rests to a considerable extent on the foundations of the ideas and sciences developed in the Middle East. How could we have modern banks or ac-

counting had it not been for the Arabic numerals which made rapid calculation possible? Ibn i Haitham a thousand years ago discovered the science of optics leading to the use of the microscope. In Iran, the millennial celebration of Avicenna is taking place—the man who wrote one of the greatest collections of medical lore known before the eighteenth century. Similarly our moral values, our ideas, and our symbols of cultural intercourse to a great extent originated in the Middle East. If by some ill wind we were suddenly to be deprived of the heritage given us by the Middle East, we would be deprived of much of the basis of the advanced state of our present day civilization.

Yet this area—with its past elements of greatness and its promise for the future—is today involved in difficulties to such an extent that it can truly be called a “trouble area” of the world. And we as a country are more involved in the problems of the area than ever before. Why is this so? The answer is simple. We can no longer avoid these problems even if we would choose to do so—and we cannot choose to do so—in the interests of our own welfare and security.

The United States has been thrust into the Middle Eastern scene suddenly and without adequate national preparation. During most of our national growth the peoples and problems of the Middle East have seemed remote from our daily lives. Because of our expanding continental boundaries, our eyes were naturally turned toward our own West until 1900. Our concern was with national developments and with Latin America. The United States later involved in two world conflicts, then focused most of its attention on Europe and the Far East. For long the Middle East knew only American missionaries, archeologists, doctors, and educators.

In this period the United States had a humanitarian interest in developments in the Middle East; it had a few trade interests, but other than that our positive interests were few. Then, as now, we had no interests of a colonial nature, no alliances that gave us direct political responsibilities.

Our position in the Middle East has changed simply because our world position has changed and because the world in which we live has changed, changed to where there is in the East-West situation for the first time an ever present

and continuous threat to the security of our own country. The day when we could look at a few large countries and say "these—and what happens there—are important to us" is unfortunately gone. Today one can scarcely think of an area and say it is safe and secure and we need not concern ourselves. Least of all can we say that about the Middle East.

Importance of Area to U.S.

I say least of all the Middle East for many reasons. First of all—and this must always come first—are the people of the Middle East itself, some 65 million souls, whose welfare concerns us and whose views and policies are influential throughout the whole Asian-African belt of restive people. Secondly there is the strategic position of the Middle East from a geographic viewpoint. History is amply tabled with the names of conquerors and would-be conquerors who have used this crossroads of three continents in their search for empires. Every major international airline connecting Asia with Europe and the United States passes through the Middle East. The Suez Canal is a vital artery of world shipping, offering an easy route to South Asia, with its tremendous sources of manpower and raw materials, and to the continent of Africa, with its deposits of uranium, manganese, chrome and copper. General Eisenhower has said, "As far as sheer value of territory is concerned, there is no more strategically important area in the world." And thirdly, one must think of the resources of the area. Without the oil of the Middle East the industries of our allies would be paralyzed and our own would be overworked. It is of vast importance that such resources not come into the hands of enemies of the non-Communist world.

Out of these three points come the objectives of American policy in the Middle East. In themselves these appear as simple matters: (1) the promotion of peace in the area among the Middle Eastern states themselves as well as better understanding between them and the Western Powers; (2) a desire to see governmental stability and the maintenance of law and order; (3) the creation of conditions which would bring about a rise in the general economic welfare; (4) the preservation and strengthening of democracy's growth—not necessarily in our own pattern, but at least in a

form which recognizes the same basic principles as the democracy in which we believe; and (5) the encouragement of regional defense measures against aggression from outside the area.

Yet the troubles and undercurrents which exist today in the Middle East make it exceedingly difficult for us to reach our objectives. Many of the nations in this area are newly independent and therefore extremely jealous of their national sovereignty. After years of occupation, or foreign entanglements of various sorts, they are suspicious of all foreign influence. In some cases, the doctrine of nationalism has assumed extreme forms.

Some of these states are fearful. In certain areas the fear of one's neighbor exceeds that from any other direction. It is a surprise to many Americans that Soviet encroachment and imperialism is not recognized in parts of the Middle East as the primary danger. Some of the Middle East see an enemy much closer at hand. They turn their thoughts and actions not toward the security of the whole region but to security of one against the other, and they thus present a picture of disunity of purpose which can be and is being exploited by the agents of the Soviet Union.

And then there is fear even of one's own kind. Many Middle Easterners look upon their governments as cold and selfish bodies little interested in the welfare of the people under it. Therefore, whom to trust? Whom to believe in? Whom to work for? The result has been a pattern of political instability.

Finally, the difficulties are made even greater by the economic poverty and inequalities in the region. Those countries which have no mineral wealth such as oil face tremendous problems in any effort to improve their well-being. Without aid of other countries it is impossible for some of them to even start the necessary development of their country.

In an effort to assist constructively in the solution of the basic causes of instability in the area one finds that the political base upon which to work does not today exist. The all-absorbing attention of governments and people is at present focused to too great an extent upon disputes which lie within the area or between states of the area and outside powers. The list of these disputes is appalling. The Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez Canal base and in the Sudan, the great com-

plex of Arab-Israeli problems, the dispute over boundaries in the Trucial coast area between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. To this could be added many lesser grievances. One must, to complete the picture, add on one side the situation in North Africa between the French and the local populations in Morocco and Tunisia, and on the other the difficulties between India and Pakistan, symbolized by the Kashmir question, because these, while outside the Middle East itself, have a bearing upon the stability of the area as a whole.

In each of these problems the United States is involved—involved either because our influence is sought or because we must take a position in the United Nations or between two friends, or because we feel a mutually satisfactory solution is so important to the security of the area and hence to ourselves that we must take an active interest.

The Arab-Israeli Situation

I shall only attempt to cover, and that briefly, one of these specific situations tonight. I have chosen for this purpose the most fundamental of all these disputes, the one most detrimental to the renaissance that seems overdue in the area and the one which seems least capable of early and satisfactory solution. I refer to the Arab-Israeli situation.

You are, of course, aware of the general factors underlying the establishment of Israel. In lending their support, the American people acted in large measure out of sympathy and horror at the outrages committed against the Jewish people in Europe during the past 25 years.

The people of the Arab States have cried out against this action of the United States. The birth of the tragic Arab refugee problem out of the Palestine conflict has added to the real and deep-seated bitterness which replaced, to some extent at least, an earlier faith in the United States. The emotions which surround this problem in the Middle East are so tense that any immediate or dramatic solution of the problem is impossible. Even progress toward solution of any segment of the problem is at best exceedingly difficult. Yet I am convinced that the United States must, in its own interests, devote a major effort toward easing the tensions that have sprung from this situation. There is today a blockade, one might say almost an iron curtain, between the Arab

States and Israel. In these circumstances new generations of youth are being brought up in isolation and cannot judge for themselves the truth of the propaganda falling on their ears. It is a situation which, if not corrected, has in it the seeds of still more disastrous conflict in the Middle East.

What are the cases of the two sides of this dispute? Here are the views of David, who migrated to Israel and is now an Israeli citizen, and the views of Ahmed, a citizen of an Arab State near the Israel borders.

THE ISRAELI CASE

David sees in Israel's creation the fulfillment of the prophecy of Ezekiel (XXXVII, 21), "Behold, I will take the children of Israel from among the heathen, whither they be gone, and will gather them on every side, and bring them into their own land." This lends a mystical force to the work of David and other founders of Israel.

David declares that the present borders of Israel, including the additional territory beyond the line recommended by the United Nations partition resolution of 1947, are the result of the conflict provoked by the Arabs' unsuccessful assault on the new state. Any significant change to the detriment of Israel in these frontiers, which were won by Israeli blood, would therefore be to him unthinkable and unjust.

It follows in his thinking that the refugee problem was not created by Israel. He maintains the Arabs of Palestine were induced to flee in large numbers as part of a deliberate policy of their leaders, which backfired. He believes they were told that their exodus would assist in crippling Israel and that after a few weeks of fighting they would return on the heels of the victorious Arab armies. He repeats often the charge that, instead of caring for their own, the Arab States actually obstruct refugee resettlement, forcing these unfortunate people to rot in camps and endeavoring to use their plight as a vehicle through which to appeal to world sympathies. By contrast, he says Israel has opened her doors to over 700,000 immigrants. In his eyes, Israel deserves world support since it has lifted from the world's conscience the burden of determining what should be done with Jewish victims of anti-Semitic persecution, as through heavy sacrifice the people of Israel, assisted by world Jewry, are integrating these

refugees into Israel, creating for them new homes and means of livelihood. He feels an obligation to provide a haven for still further Jewish immigrants, either to rescue them from persecution or even perhaps to strengthen Israel by increasing her population.

David maintains that the possibility of the return of Arab refugees to Israel in appreciable numbers no longer exists. Their land has been taken up. However, he points out that ample land and water both exist in the Arab States which could be made available to these Palestinians. In addition, he states their return would present an unacceptable security problem, particularly in the face of the continued hostility of Israel's neighbors. He says Israel is, however, willing to assist in their reintegration elsewhere. Certain blocked funds have already been released to the Arab refugees, and he says Israel is prepared, by paying compensation, to contribute economically to their integration in the Arab countries.

He says water means life for Israel's economy; prospects for self-sufficiency depend upon full development of available water resources. David maintains that obstructionist Arab policies and a dog-in-manger attitude therefore cannot be permitted to stop irrigation plans. In his eyes the Arab States possess ample water resources of their own; why then should they lay claim to the meager streams to which Israel has access?

To David, the soul of Israel is in Jerusalem, a city to which generations of Jews have longed to return. To surrender control of new Jerusalem to any other entity he would see as out of the question. He notes that the Christian and Moslem holy places, in which the world religious community has a legitimate interest, are largely concentrated in the areas now held by Jordan. He says Israel is willing to give the firmest guarantees with respect to holy places within the territory under its control and is willing to provide free access to them but is unwilling to trust the lives of Jewish citizens to some nonexistent international force.

For safety from its threatening neighbors, he says Israel has and must in the future depend primarily upon its army and its own people. In the crucial days of 1948, he points out, the United Nations was unable to prevent six Arab armies from invading Israel—and that Israel's arms, courage, and resourcefulness alone turned back

the invaders. At the moment, he sees Israel's frontiers subjected to increasing pressures which the United Nations and the world powers have proved impotent to stop.

This, then, is David's case. He has repeatedly urged the Arab States to sit down with Israel at a conference table to conclude peace on the above basis. The Arabs have persistently refused. They take an almost diametrically opposed stand on the same issues.

THE ARAB CASE

The Arab case must be considered in the context of the present emotional ferment in the Arab world. Ahmed, the Arab, regards the creation of Israel as another example of imperialist exploitation. Thus, his reaction against Israel dovetails with the growing nationalism of his people and feeds their resentment and distrust of the West. Ahmed's instinctive reaction to the alien element of Israel is to build up a wall against it, to isolate it, and eventually to absorb or overwhelm it. Unaffected by the value we place on time, Ahmed is content to wait, confident that Israel will eventually meet the fate which befell the Crusades.

Ahmed concentrates his bitterness on political Zionism which he regards as ruthless, materialistic, and exemplifying those traits of Western culture most antipathetical to him. He declares that Moslems, Christians, and Jews lived in harmony until this political factor was injected by the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Ahmed fears that further immigration of Jewish people to Israel will inevitably result in territorial expansion by Israel, and his fears are based on statements by Zionist leaders who look to further immigration.

To Ahmed the creation of Israel may not be justified on any ethical or legal grounds. For many centuries the land belonged to his people. A tiny Jewish minority was well treated. Ahmed sees no ethnic basis for the claim that the Jews now returning are descendants of the original inhabitants. He points out that the United Nations was not granted by the Charter the authority to deprive a people of self-government or drive them from their lands.

Ahmed feels that, if Israel bases her claim to statehood on the 1947 U.N. resolution, she must at least recognize the boundaries recommended by the United Nations. Israel cannot in his eyes have

it both ways. He demands that the Security Council should now force Israel to relinquish her gains won by the force of arms.

The Arab refugees are seen by him as the end-product of Israeli terrorism, driven from their homes by cold-blooded massacres, such as that at Deir Yassin, where over 200 people died at the hands of the Irgun. He sees no conceivable justification for preventing refugees who wish to do so from returning to their homes as called for by the United Nations on successive occasions. In any event, he says the vast sums owed by Israel to the refugees for confiscated property should be paid promptly.

Accordingly, Ahmed does not wish his nation to cooperate with Israel in any matter and he would like to see third parties prevented from doing so. Whether this policy may also hurt him is a secondary consideration. The economic boycott maintained reflects this viewpoint. He maintains that Israel would quickly collapse were it not for United States public and private aid. Since the United States sustains Israel, he feels it must assume responsibility for Israel's actions.

Ahmed believes the city of Jerusalem should be internationalized in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations. The fact that Israel has transferred her capital to Jerusalem only indicates to him disrespect for the United Nations and the intent to seize additional territory, for no nation would locate without a purpose its capital in such an exposed position.

Although Israel talks of peace, he sees it as bent only on aggression. Proof in his eyes is such acts as Qibya and the recent attack on Nahhalin, both, he feels, deliberately planned by the Israel Government. If Israel wants peace, he believes she must demonstrate this by actions and win the confidence of her neighbors. As a first step, he says, Israel must abide by the resolutions of the United Nations, particularly with respect to boundaries and the repatriation of refugees. On this basis, he says the Arab States would be prepared to discuss a settlement.

These are the cases. And as I speak here tonight the bitterness between David and Ahmed and their people and the dangers seem, in spite of all efforts, to increase rather than diminish.

One wonders often in a position such as mine if he may not be struggling in a situation so set by the strands of the past that the history of what

will happen, in spite of all of one's efforts, may have been already written—and thousands of years ago. Yet even if this be true we must to the limits of our knowledge and capability do that which seems best for the interests of the area itself and our own country.

Special Interests vs. Interests of Majority

When I talk about the interests of our country, I mean our country as a whole. It is only natural in a situation such as this that there would be special groups who feel strongly and attempt in all sincerity to exert the greatest possible influence on the policy of your Government. We must weigh these special interests carefully, but we must also shape our policy and so conduct our daily acts as to represent the interests of the majority of our people where vital issues affecting our own security are concerned. I am certain no American would quarrel with this concept.

What I allude to is that a pro-Israeli, or a pro-Arab policy, has no place in our thinking. What your Government strives to put into effect is a policy (I quote the President) of "sympathetic and impartial friendship" to all the states in the Middle East. Neither side, we believe, at the moment thinks that this can be true. Both now believe we are partial to the other. Both tend to be guided by the Biblical statement: "He that is not with me is against me." It is difficult, close to impossible, for them to understand that we can be friends to both and yet be impartial in our policies.

It may be difficult and it may take long, but I am certain you will agree with me that we should so conduct ourselves in the area as to clearly demonstrate that our government has nothing except a truly objective policy. If we are to be accused of being "pro" anything, let us make it amply clear that that prefix can only apply to one thing, and that is that our policy is first and foremost "pro-American."

Specific problems of this issue are of great interest such as the refugee situation, border delineation, matters of compensation, the status of Jerusalem, an equitable division of the vital waters of the Jordan, etc., etc. These are matters which would cover many times the allotted time I have here this evening. We will judge each of these

major issues and each daily friction that may arise on its merits as we see them and work unceasingly for a reconciliation which we believe to be in the best interests of all.

I shall only draw two conclusions on this situation this evening.

To the Israelis I say that you should come to truly look upon yourselves as a Middle Eastern State and see your own future in that context rather than as a headquarters, or nucleus so to speak, of worldwide groupings of peoples of a particular religious faith who must have special rights within and obligations to the Israeli state. You should drop the attitude of the conqueror and the conviction that force and a policy of retaliatory killings is the only policy that your neighbors will understand. You should make your deeds correspond to your frequent utterance of the desire for peace.

To the Arabs I say you should accept this State of Israel as an accomplished fact. I say further that you are deliberately attempting to maintain a state of affairs delicately suspended between peace and war, while at present desiring neither. This is a most dangerous policy and one which world opinion will increasingly condemn if you continue to resist any move to obtain at least a less dangerous *modus vivendi* with your neighbor.

The Broader Issues

Turning away from the specific again to broader issues, you will readily realize that in the issue I have just described the United States is somewhat in the "middle." This is also true in many of the other disputes in the area, some of which I enumerated a few minutes ago. Difficult as the position of being in the middle may be on the issue I have just described, it is even more delicate in some of the other disputes. This is true as some of these disputes are between friendly states of the area and major allies of the United States. In such cases one cannot judge the overall interests of the United States entirely by what appear to be the merits of the particular issue locally. As an example, the North African situation has worldwide ramifications. On the one hand we see it affecting interests which France believes vital to her continued role as a world power and as affecting her role in matters of great importance to the United States, such as French Indochina and the

development of an integrated Europe. On the other, we see, in the struggle for freedom in North Africa, the seeds of dissension which affect the position of the West in the entire Moslem world, which spreads from Morocco to Indonesia. All this is in addition to merits or demerits of the effect of French policy in the local area. This illustration of the worldwide ramifications of local problems could be extended if we should substitute Egypt and Iran for North Africa and the United Kingdom for France.

The United States must consider with great care the implications of throwing whatever influence we may have in such situations to one side or the other. Such a choosing of sides is often difficult in any event as, being outside parties, we can see merits on each side of the issue.

Our role in these cases is to attempt to assist both parties to arrive at an arrangement which both sides would accept as satisfactory. The fact that there be solutions of this nature to these disputes, under present world conditions, is often more important to the United States than the terms of that solution.

This is a role in which one cannot expect popularity and certainly one which we have not accepted with pleasure. When nations of the area become impatient because the United States does not more fully support the causes of their own nationalism, we might ask them to think of the historical significance of the fact that the United States, in the span of a few short years, has moved to where it is playing such a middle role. They must realize that in the end, however, their long-range interests cannot be served if the United States overplays such a role to the point of endangering the great NATO organization that is today the only organized strength of the free world against Soviet encroachment.

The analogy was recently put forward by one of our diplomatic representatives that the pressures upon us were similar to a number of people tugging at one person, the United States, with a vast number of ropes. When one pulled, there was a corresponding tightening of the rope held by another. A wise Arab statesman to whom the analogy was presented suggested that the only recourse for the United States was, therefore, "to divide justice." Without arguing the concept of whether justice is in fact divisible, we do and will continue to make an honest effort to respond to the

needs of our friends within the limits of our own national interests, our commitments, and our resources, but we will also recognize, as did the Arab statesman, that we cannot please all the nations and special interests which are calling upon us.

We have reluctantly inherited a position where every action or lack of action, every word spoken or left unsaid, is of significance to one or all of these nations, and it has become necessary to weigh carefully the effect in one part of the world of an attempted action in another. We must see to it that we weigh these matters carefully if we are to live up to the position of leadership in which we have been placed. Those who feel and speak with emotion on some of these problems must bear this in mind even if they are not in positions of responsibility within the government. The temper of our people is closely judged from abroad as well as our daily acts in government.

In all this range of problems it would be foolhardy to be optimistic. Yet it would be equally dangerous and quite unwarranted to be totally discouraged. Some progress is being made and there are several grounds for encouragement. One hope that I see is a steady growth of American awareness of Middle Eastern problems and a determination to see the United States fulfill its part in resolving those problems. Another hope is the general evolution now taking place in the Middle East, whereby leaders are becoming more responsive to the demands of public welfare. In fulfilling these demands there will inevitably be change amounting to virtual revolution. We are sympathetic with the motives behind this revolution and we would like to assist it as much as possible to run in an orderly productive channel.

I cannot close without asking all to weigh gravely the world in which we live today. Despite the recent events at Eniwetok, it is still hard for us to realize the unprecedented nature of the danger recent scientific achievement has brought upon us and equally hard to realize the prospects of future well-being that such discoveries, under better world conditions, could also bring.

When one considers that man is at this very time in the process of mastering weapons that could destroy our civilization, one might think that local political issues around the world should become less significant. But, when we consider

how these issues could expand step by step, until the world could be led to war, we can only dedicate ourselves humbly, with the guidance of our Creator, to strive with renewed energy to see that they are settled.

Facing Realities in the Arab-Israeli Dispute

*by Henry A. Byroade
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Tonight I shall speak of the Middle East. Public addresses on this subject often take the same form. There is a general review of the importance of the Middle East, and this is stated in terms of its people, its strategic location, and its natural resources. One covers the economic and political problems of the area. Then there is an outline of the role of the United States in attempting to assist in the development and stability of this important area. It is within this context that a specific problem of the Middle East is usually discussed. This format is used because such an approach aids immeasurably in putting each specific problem in the context where its true importance can be properly evaluated.

I am going to reverse this procedure tonight and talk more about a specific problem and the bearing it may have upon the Middle East as a whole. I refer to the Arab-Israeli complex of problems. There is a stereotype presentation on this subject as well. One covers the history behind the conflict—the divergent points of view—and such advice as he can muster for a solution. I wish to reverse this procedure as well and devote my time to a few fundamentals that, in my opinion, lie at the very roots of this dispute.

I shall begin with certain developments within our own country. It is natural for an American, surrounded as he seems to be with the necessities of life at hand, to be to a certain extent an isolationist. The American is moved from that position only reluctantly and only when he senses developments overseas that may change his way of life. Apart from a basic instinct of humanitarianism, he does not wish to concern himself with matters overseas unless this appears to be a necessity.

Thus the thoughts of Americans are turned largely within our own country except in event of war or threat of war that can affect our own security. America had the luxury of concentrating its attention almost exclusively upon its own development until fairly recently. The first World War involved our forces in Europe, and America came to know Europe far better. This was an interest which lasted because the making and preservation of peace was a vital interest to us. The second world conflagration took us to the Far East as well as to Europe. America again had a costly lesson in geography and again has retained her interest because of the uneasy and interrupted peace that has followed. In these interruptions we have come to know Korea, and now Indochina is a familiar spot on the map to nearly every American.

With all of these developments, America now knows that insecurity almost anywhere in the world can affect our own security. It is with this new realization that American eyes turn toward the Middle East. This time we are determined that our attention will be focused on an area prior and not subsequent to an outbreak of hostilities that may affect us.

In looking toward the Middle East, America sees an area generally defenseless and with such internal and external problems as to submerge, in the thinking of its people, the real danger we see to all nations who strive for continued freedom. The American wonders why these sources of friction cannot be cured. He feels his Government should do what it can to ease these trouble spots. He sees them as diverting energies that are needed for creating strength and a better standard of living. These he would wish for all free people instinctively; now he sees in the absence of such conditions a threat to his own welfare and security.

Our own emergence as a leader in the free world, and the inherent responsibilities thereof, coupled with the fact that we see for the first time a continuing and grave threat to our security, make it inevitable that we should attempt to be a factor leading toward progress and stability across the entire Middle East. This is a trend of historical significance which has an important bearing upon our approach to, and concern over, each of the factors of instability in the Middle East.

Whenever the United States became concerned about the security of the Middle East as a whole—

and I believe the process started in earnest some two or three years ago, certain consequences bearing upon our central subject for this evening would also be inevitable. We would see on the one hand the people of Israel become restive and to a certain extent emotionally excitable over what the consequences of such a trend might mean to them. They would wonder how far our concern with conditions in the area as a whole would lead to a lessening of interest of America toward the support of Israel. In their concern they might imagine that the efforts of the United States across the area would lead us to seek friendships at the expense of the interests of their own state. The Arab peoples, on the other hand, sensing a new importance in our eyes, might conclude that their bargaining position had risen. Some of them would press relentlessly—as they sensed the move of the pendulum—to shove it all the way so that a policy of “impartial friendship” would in effect mean complete partiality toward their side. They would thus be critical of honest efforts of the United States to carry out this policy of impartiality. Criticism would thus be in store for the United States from both sides of the Arab-Israeli Armistice lines.

It seems to me we have reached the stage in this process where each side honestly feels we are partial to the other. In a crude sort of way perhaps this could be called progress—progress toward the ultimate goal of having both sides feel we are truly impartial. It is not a situation, however, about which one can take pleasure. It is, for instance, a concern to us that Israel is prone to see dangers to herself in such a process and to exaggerate far beyond what seem to us to be the realities of the situation. We see no basis in our acts to justify her fear that her legitimate interests are placed in jeopardy by United States concern over the area as a whole. We might rather ask her what would be the fate of her State—as we can, of course, ask the Arabs as well—if the Middle East continued in turmoil and the whole of the area was lost to the control and influence of the Soviet Union.

To understand our concern over developments in this part of the world, it is necessary to understand that we do see an increasing danger that the Middle East may be relegated to a satellite status under the Soviet Union. Most people in the Middle East who read this statement will label it as “alarmist” and without foundation of fact. The very fact

that this reaction will exist is partly the cause of our concern.

Growing Danger of Soviet Aggression

It has been my view that the Middle East, on the timetable of the Soviet Union, has been placed in priority behind that of Europe and the Far East simply because they look upon it as an area that can wait. The more Russia's aggressive moves are stalemated in Europe and the Far East, the more the danger grows for the Middle East.

There are now a number of indications that Soviet intentions are being focused to a new degree upon this part of the world. Throughout my entire tenure in my present position, I have been expecting this change of attitude to show itself within the United Nations. This has now happened. The Arab-Israeli conflict, so often before the United Nations, has until recently been free of abusive veto power of the Soviet Union. They have now wielded their veto twice in succession on this matter in the Security Council. They are stepping up their propaganda among the groups in the Middle East who are suffering most acutely from the prolongation of tensions and hardships occasioned thereby—and who are thus most susceptible to such propaganda. It must be obvious to anyone that, if the Soviet Union were to succeed in an effort to move into that area and accomplish there what they have accomplished in North Korea, in China, and in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe, the free countries of both Europe and the Far East would be outflanked and in greatly increased peril. The land gateway to Africa would be open. The tremendous resources of the area would be in enemy hands.

Many in the Arab world see this extension of the hand of Russia as a friendly move to take their side of the case against Israel. They have sent messages of appreciation to Moscow. I believe this facade of friendship to be indeed a motive of the Kremlin—but I believe it to be only a by-product of their real intentions. In this, as in many other past acts of the Kremlin, we see a double objective. One of these, and it is the lesser, is to make the Arab world feel Russia has honest friendly intentions toward them. The other, and this we see as their primary objective, is to stymie United Nations action in order to

maintain and increase the dangerous tensions that exist within the area. If we can derive any benefit from past acts of Soviet Russia, it should at least be an appreciation in advance that the Kremlin would consider such results to be in her overall interests.

We hope all concerned, in their obsession over local problems within the area, will not look with blind eyes upon these new developments, as they have within them the seeds of trouble greater than they have ever known.

Let us tonight try to look beyond the claims and counterclaims of misdeeds, border incidents, and propaganda of both sides of the Arab-Israeli dispute. These are in large part symptoms of the disease. Let us look rather at what appear to be some of its fundamentals.

Looking at the Fundamentals

In dealing with these fundamentals I should like to make one stipulation and one explanation. In response to every public address on this problem, we are always confronted with the reaction: "Someone should remind this speaker that certain other factors—which he failed to mention—also exist." The stipulation, therefore, is that I realize that what I list here tonight will not be in itself complete—nor could it be within the contents of one short address. The explanation concerns the reason why I should feel impelled to speak so frankly of policies or acts of other sovereign states. My reason is that I feel the dangers in this situation are such that the American people are entitled to be informed of underlying facts of a dispute which may increasingly affect the security of the Middle East—and hence of our own country.

POSSIBILITY OF EARLY PEACE TREATY

The first fundamental I would list is that the possibility of an early and formal peace treaty type of settlement between Israel and the Arab States just does not exist. As the whole world so sorely needs a solution—and the dangers of a continuation of a prolonged armistice are so great—one can only reach such a conclusion with the greatest reluctance and concern. I can only give it as a conclusion of one who has devoted the major share of his working hours to this problem over a

considerable period of time. Many times during that period I have challenged the validity of that conclusion, only to be convinced again of its basic soundness. There is no inspired formula which can quickly erase the underlying causes for the mutual feeling of hostility and distrust that exists between Israel and the Arab States.

To reach such a conclusion does not mean losing hope, but rather to establish a basic fact. The difficulties in solving this issue do not lie in the techniques of approach by outside powers—however imperfect they may be—but in the substance of the problem itself. The first lesson is, therefore, clear. All concerned should abandon a will-of-the-wisp search for an all embracing formula and concentrate on what can be done—within the limits of practicability—on the substance of the matter.

Let no one doubt, because of what I have just said, that a basic policy of the United States is to see peaceful conditions established in the Near East. To those Arab critics of a portion of my recent address at Dayton who say that the United States must realize that the attainment of better relations between Israel and the Arab States should be abandoned as a U.S. objective, my answer is that they may as well know now that our country cannot accept such a price to earn the friendship of the Arab States, a friendship which it so earnestly desires.

To those, however, who demand immediate and forceful action on our part to obtain peace, I ask that they not lose sight of the conditions which must be fulfilled before a genuine and lasting peace can be achieved. We all remember that at the close of the First World War a very neat job of peacemaking was done at Versailles. The leaders of the World sat around the conference table and gave their best thought to the drafting of what was going to be a comprehensive peace settlement to last for all time. The conditions for peace, however, were not established and the job done at Versailles went for naught.

When we ask the Arab States to accept the existence of the State of Israel and refrain from hostile acts toward her, it seems only fair to me that they should have the right to know, with far greater assurances than have ever been given them, the magnitude of this new State. They look upon it as a product of expansionist Zionism which, re-

ardless of any present promise or paper treaty, will ultimately commit aggression to expand to suit its future needs.

UNDERSTANDING ARABS' FEAR

The second fundamental I would list is, therefore, that this fear of the Arabs should be understood and met not only by the assurances of great powers but by Israel itself.

I again refer for convenience's sake to my recent Dayton speech. In that speech, I said Israel should see her own future in the context of a Middle Eastern state and not as a headquarters of worldwide groupings of peoples of a particular religious faith who must have special rights within and obligations to the Israeli State. This sentence has been interpreted by some as an intrusion into religious matters, improper for a governmental official. The fact is that I was referring, among other things, to one of the key reasons for the above fear of the Arabs.

I was not referring in any way to, or casting aspersions upon, the natural feeling of affinity one feels for a brother of his own religious faith, wherever he may be. The principles of the United States on matters of religious freedom are so well known that this assertion of mine should need no expansion.

Nor was I referring in any way to proper philanthropic support, in its broadest sense, by American citizens of Jewish faith in the economic development necessary to achieve a reasonable standard of living of Israel's people—nor to support of religious, educational, and cultural enterprises in Israel. There is no divergence between our Government and American citizens of the Jewish faith who are interested in the development and welfare of the State of Israel.

What I was referring to were matters of grave concern in my own field of foreign affairs. As an example, let us consider, for instance, the question of immigration into Israel, in connection with the fear I have just mentioned on the part of the Arabs.

If we can turn to logic, it seems to me that this particular aspect of the overall problem should be one within the realm of possible correction. It is a fact now that immigration has fallen off to insignificant numbers, and there is often a close balance between incoming and outgoing for any

given period. It is also in all probability a fact that natural factors, including the economics of the situation, would prevent people from voluntarily crowding together to where overpopulation could reach the danger point. It is also a fact that in the past 6 years most of the historic trouble spots for world Jewry have been evacuated. There remain in the world only two areas where really large populations of those of Jewish faith still live. One of these is the United States. It does not seem to me to be a fact that a great mass of Americans of Jewish faith are about to emigrate and take on Israeli citizenship. The other area is the Soviet Union and its satellites. We know that the lot of the Jews behind the Iron Curtain, like that of many other religious or ethnic groups, is a miserable one, and our heart goes out to them as to all others in that category. Yet we do not see the Kremlin opening its gates, with all the obvious disadvantages to it of such a break in its curtain, to release these unfortunate people of the Jewish faith. If and when the Soviets decide to do so, it will be because of their desire to set the area aflame by fostering new and greater trouble in the Middle East. If such an eventuality actually happened, the magnitude of the problem would be such that the whole free world, not just Israel, would have to concern itself with the resettlement of Jewish immigrants from behind the Iron Curtain.

One might expect all the above should be so well known that the subject of immigration into Israel should not be a source of tension. This, unfortunately, is not the case. It is not peculiar to this area of the world that one suspects his enemy of the worst and never the best. In the emotions which surround this problem, such sheer logic does not spread. What does spread like wildfire throughout the Middle East is a series of statements from Israel calling for greatly expanded immigration. A constant fear is that these urgings in terms of extra millions will be heeded. Their fears are enhanced by the knowledge that the only limitation imposed by statute on immigration into Israel is, in fact, the total number of those of the Jewish faith in the entire world. The Arabs know the capacity of the territory of Israel is limited. They see only one result—future attempt at territorial expansion—and hence warfare of serious proportions.

My friends, can one be injecting himself into

improper fields by speaking of matters such as this that lie deep at the roots of a conflict so dangerous to us? I realize I am referring to matters on which strong religious and humanitarian feelings exist on the part of many. I can only implore those who have such feelings not to ignore the feelings of others, nor the dangers of the world in which we live. Surely it is not asking too much to ask Israel to find some way to lay at rest these fears of her neighbors and remove this specter—which does not seem to be based upon reality—from minds in the Middle East. The tensions of the Middle East, which are translating themselves into almost daily needless loss of human lives, could be considerably lessened if wise statesmanship could find a way of such accomplishment.

DISTRUST OF U.S. MOTIVES

Another fundamental which I believe American citizens in particular must consider is the fact that there is a great deal of mistrust of the great powers and, in particular, the United States on the Arab-Israeli issue. This may come as a shock to many an American who would find it hard to believe that our motives could be so misunderstood.

I believe the Arab world today believes that the United States would not allow an attack by them upon Israel with the purpose of driving her into the sea. I also believe, however, that in general the Arab people are not convinced that the opposite is true—and that they question our ability to fulfill our obligations in opposing aggression under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 if Israel herself should decide upon expansive aggression. I do not believe they doubt the sincerity of the leaders of our Government when they clearly restate our adherence to that declaration—but they wonder at our ability to follow through. They wonder if the domestic political aspects of such a problem in the United States, as well as within the domestic scenes of our allies—but particularly in the United States—might not make it impossible for us to live up to our stated intentions.

I know the Arabs are wrong in this interpretation of the American people. Yet I believe it is a fact that many of them do have such an interpretation. One can only ask their reporters in this country to make a further real effort to judge the temper of the American people. I am confident that after such a renewed study they would

indicate to their governments that America would back no state, including Israel, in a matter of expansive aggression and that its opposition would be equally strong regardless of which side started such a move.

If this fact could be established in the Arab mind, we would have passed one of our greatest difficulties in dealings with them. When and if such reports from their own representatives will begin to have an effect in the Arab world we do not know. We will know, however, when that effect has taken place because we will then encounter a far greater measure of confidence on the part of the Arab world.

REFUGEE SITUATION

Another fundamental we should keep in mind is the fact that a portion of the people involved in this dispute are homeless. The reason behind this, as with nearly every other facet of the whole complex of Arab-Israeli problems, is itself in dispute. More time and effort is spent upon justifying this or that stand as to who is more nearly to be blamed than is spent upon how to solve the problem that now exists. What a breath of fresh air would be given the world if all concerned would simply admit the fundamental fact that these people are homeless—are in desperate want—and are uncompensated for their property and other losses that they have suffered. Can anyone benefit by the continued compression of these people in tiny areas and in other circumstances that make for moral degeneration and the making of a new generation fed on bitterness and hate?

There is a moral obligation in this situation that rests upon the countries immediately involved and upon all of the countries who have a stake in world peace. A solution of this problem would do more than anything else to reduce the incidents of border violence.

For our part, we have seen the most practical and long-term solution for the majority of these people to be the provision of new lands for settlement. Material assistance has been provided to the United Nations by this country as well as others to make such developments possible. The United States has expressed its willingness to help provide funds for a development plan of the Jordan Valley which would allow resettlement of a sizable portion of the Arab refugees. We have

also indicated our willingness to assist in developments elsewhere which would provide the opportunity for employment and the eventual procurement of homes for large numbers of people. The United States has also stood for the resettlement of a portion of the refugees in the territory of Israel. It should be borne in mind that they mostly lived as farmers on terraced land which probably only they are likely to make fertile and productive.

Some small progress is being made, but this approach alone is probably too slow in the face of the present situation. One must look, therefore, to additional steps that might have a more immediate effect. One of these is the question of compensation. These refugees, after many long years, are still uncompensated for the loss of their property, both real and personal, which was left behind in Israel.

The sense of property is almost as integral a part of the makeup of modern man as the sense of a family or nation. So long as the refugees have no meaningful assurances that they will ever be compensated for their property, it will be hard for them to adjust to a new set of conditions or to bend their efforts toward finding a new livelihood. They read every day of transactions whereby the "abandoned" property left behind in Israel is being transferred, bought, and sold. They have heard many statements made of the intentions of Israel, but such statements *in vacuo* are not reassuring. The fact that Israel has obtained and is now using restitution from Germany while doing nothing toward the compensation of Arab refugees understandably adds to their bitterness.

Clearly this is a matter to be attended to. I do not believe, however, that Israel will refuse to discuss matters such as this on a realistic basis with her neighbors. We believe Arab governments who refuse on general principle to entertain any discussions with their Israeli neighbors may among other things be depriving themselves and their Moslem brothers in the refugee camps of advantages that could be theirs. On the other hand, if the goal to be sought in the first instance is the lessening of tensions along the borders, Israel might find some way of arranging for step-by-step moves on such specific problems without giving the suspicion to her neighbors that her policy is one of "total peace or nothing."

QUARREL BASICALLY NATIONALISTIC

There is another fundamental which we should have in mind, if only for the sake of our own understanding of the true nature of the problem. It is that the quarrel which divides the Arab States and Israel is not basically religious. It is essentially a nationalistic quarrel such as could arise with equal bitterness between two other peoples whose national aspirations clashed.

For many centuries Jews and Arabs lived side by side in the Middle East in relative harmony. There is much that is similar in their religions. Both stem from the same ancient Near Eastern philosophy, as does for that matter a large part of the Christian religion.

These two peoples of similar language, history, and culture are at each other's throats because they each want to possess the same piece of land. The Arabs have opposed the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, which ancient history as well as religion led the Jews to consider their homeland—but which modern history has seen in the hands of the Arabs.

The fact that the Arab and the Jew have different though similar religions has importance only to the degree that recent propaganda may have made it seem important by calling on all those of the Jewish faith to support one side and all of those of the Moslem faith to support the other.

NEED FOR BASIC CHANGE IN ATTITUDE

The last fundamental I would list is one of basic attitude. Perhaps in the end there would be no advantage at all in formal peace—even if it could be quickly obtained—unless there could be some basic change in the attitude with which one looks upon his neighbor. The formalities of paper agreements mean little if there remains thereafter contempt and suspicion. This is a matter in which an outsider can have little influence, but he can point out the need to display a sincere wish for the desire for better relations if they are ever to be attained.

In this, an attitude of superiority and contempt for one's neighbor is unlikely to cause a forthcoming response. On the other hand, the world's history does not record that an attitude of negativism has produced benefits for anyone. There is this negativism on the Arab side and it repre-

sents a formidable obstacle for constructive solutions. It seems for them easy jointly to reject but difficult jointly or individually to adopt policies of a forward-looking character in connection with this problem. This negativism seems hardened and confirmed by frontal attack, whether such attack takes the form of reprisal raids or merely a brilliant diplomatic maneuver such as the scoring of a point in the United Nations. It can best be arrested and gradually reduced in proportion by undramatic and patient efforts over a period of time. All this presupposes that the fires of hatred are not meanwhile fed. The world will carefully watch for any indication of an adoption of a philosophy, known to be held by a few, that the only way to make things better is to first make them worse.

These are some and, again, only some of the fundamentals that should be kept in mind when one attempts to judge present-day situations. It may be dangerously long before sufficient change in some of the underlying causes for continued strife are modified to a point where a genuine lack of hostility can be said to exist.

In the meantime, the efforts of all concerned should be devoted to the specific situation along the border. All concerned, it seems to us, should cooperate to the utmost with local U.N. Commissions and other arrangements as have in the past been beneficial, such as the Local Commander Agreement along the borders. The Arab States on their part should not refuse in these forums—or in any other—to discuss ways and means of lessening the present-day dangers along the border and cooperate in making preventive measures more effective.

It is only with a decrease of immediate incidents along the borders and a period of relative tranquillity that minds can turn to an honest approach to more fundamental and underlying causes of this dispute. This atmosphere one would hope would then be conducive to face the real and permanent threat to the whole area. The peoples of the Middle East could then without distraction devote more attention to the greater understanding of the real goals of Soviet imperialism. With confidence established in their interrelationships, all the states of the Middle East could concentrate and attend their energies to safeguard the precious heritage of freedom to which we all dedicate our-

selves. For the plans of Communist imperialism envisage the total destruction of the religions, cultures, and independence of us all. Each one of us must make some sacrifice to attain the preservation of common freedom. The United States for its part has shown that it is willing and anxious to go far toward making this a reality.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 5469

Near and Middle Eastern Series 16

Released May 1954

Division of Publications

